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3. Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur, and John Triman, in their benchmark study for the United Nations, Multilateralism Under Challenge: Power, International Order, and Structural
Change (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006), suggest that the UN’s response to humanitarian disasters prior to 1970 was “undeveloped” at best:
Surprising as it may now seem the United Nations system was very slow to manifest any broad responsibility for disaster response. . . .
The United Nations system was not utilized to manage a systemic and multilateral response to a broad range of humanitarian disasters until about 1970. In the well-publicized Nigerian-Biafran conflict (1967–1970), the major relief players trying to get aid to civilians in secessionist Biafra were the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and its Red Cross partners, and Joint Church Aid, a faith-based private consortium. While other relief actors like the French Red Cross acted independently, no UN organ or agency was a major player in that drama.
After Biafra . . . the General Assembly created the UN Disaster Relief Office. By 1992 this office morphed into the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs.
4. The New York Times article read in part:
The Nigerian Federal Government readies [another] “final offensive” in war with Biafra; Government spokesman says East must be subdued by end of February or growing international aid will make Federal victory impossible.
Source: Alfred Friendly Jr., “Nigerians Are Preparing for Another ‘Final’ Offensive; War With Biafra, 19 Months Old, Still Bogged Down; Mood in Once-Cocky Lagos Turns Glum as Foe Revives,” New York Times, February 5, 1969.
5. Jeffrey D. Blum, “Who Cares About Biafra Anyway?” Harvard Crimson, February 25, 1969.
6. Special to the New York Times, “Biafrans Warned of Enemy’s ‘Desperate Effort’; Ojukwu Asserts That British May Lose Holdings,” February 12, 1969.
7. Ezenwa-Ohaeto, Chinua Achebe, quoting from Chinua Achebe, “A Letter [on Stanley Diamond],” in C. W. Gailey, ed., Dialectical Anthropology: Essays in Honor of Stanley Diamond, Vol. 1 (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1992), p. 134.
8. John W. Young, The Labour Governments 1964–70, Vol. 2: International Policy (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2009); Arthur Agwuncha Nwankwo, Nigeria: The Challenge of Biafra (London: R. Collings, 1972); Ruby Bell-Gam and Uru Iyam, David, Nigeria, vol. 100 of World Bibliographical Series (Oxford: Clio Press, 1999); P. J. Odu, The Future That Vanished (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris Corporation, 2009), p. 168.
9. “Britain: Loss of Touch?” Time.
10. Speaking to journalists in Umuahia, Ojukwu
suggested that the feasible way to bring Nigeria to the bargaining table was “diplomatic victory whereby Nigeria would be faced with the specter of isolation.” Was Wilson the man to bring off such a diplomatic victory? Replied Ojukwu: “I do sincerely hope that this trip is no gimmick and that he is genuinely out for peace. It is true that his previous actions do not justify this hope. Yet for the sake of Nigeria, Biafra, Africa and Britain, one can only hope.”
Source: “Nigeria: Twin Stalemates,” Time, April 4, 1969.
Azikiwe Withdraws Support for Biafra
1. African-American Institute, Africa Report (1969).
2. Chinua Achebe Foundation interview: Dr. Okechukwu Ikejiani, March 6, 2005.
The Recapture of Owerri
1. Madiebo reports that Colonel Ogbugo Kalu achieved this surprising feat in three phases—by galvanizing the Fifty-second Brigade under Colonel Chris Ugokwe, the Third Brigade of the Fourteenth Division under Lambert Iheanacho, and the Sixty-eighth Battalion under Major Ikeji—and then surrounding the complacent troops of the Nigerian army while preventing reinforcements from reaching the Nigerians.
Source: Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, pp. 301–10.
2. During a visit to the United States in 2003, Colonel Achuzia described how he earned the nickname “Air Raid”:
I never knew I was called “Air Raid.” It was when Chief Ngbada of Abakiliki and others called me to come over to their region which was also mine (I was born in Abakiliki) to help repel the invading feds that a drama unfolded that made me know I was called Air Raid. In Abakiliki, I spent three days in a fierce battle to repel the feds from reaching Uwana—the home of Akanu Ibiam. It was brisk and very successful. On my way back, and approaching a military check point, I heard shouts of Air Raid, Air Raid everywhere. Market women were running into the bush. People were taking cover left right and center. As a war commander, I got down from my vehicle to take a look at where the plane was coming from. It was then that my orderly told me that people were running because of me. That I was also known as “Air Raid.” I immediately asked that the rumor should be dispelled immediately and people should go about their normal business. It was a sobering experience for me.
Source: Godson Ofoaro, “Ngige and Achuzia came to town,” Nigeriaworld, November 10, 2003; nigeriaworld.com.
Ugochukwu Ejinkeonye, one of Nigeria’s prized journalists, interviewed the former Biafran war leader in 2005 and discovered an Achuzia, then seventy years old, who was far from his austere reputation, amiable and reflective:
Achuzia had assumed office as the Secretary-General of Ohaneze Ndigbo, the apex socio-cultural organization in Igboland, and by this time had developed a reputation for his frankness in public statements, and the passion with which he canvassed the Igbo position on matters of national and regional interests.
Ejinkeonye found the retired colonel astutely unrepentant for his role in the Nigeria-Biafra war, even while he espoused his strong belief in a “one, united Nigeria, where equity, justice, fairness and mutual respect for one another are unreservedly operational at all levels of governance and social interactions.”
Achuzia’s perspective on the quality of the Nigerian army and why the war was fought is both instructive and alarming:
How can there be unity in an army that is packaged on what you call federal character (Nigerian version of Equal Opportunity)? People don’t join the army because they see it as a vocation; most of the people in the army are surrogates of certain people who put them there for their nefarious purposes. When we have a proper, well-oriented country, we will put together an army that will be for the protection and the defense of the people against external aggression. . . . The Igbo fought when the pogrom started, and they were being killed and pushed out of the federation. So, to ensure that they stayed in the federation, they had to fight or else, it would have meant being dispossessed of their land. So where were we expected to run to when the hostilities started—to Cameroon? So these were the reasons. Again, you must try to differentiate the reasons for the Civil War from the reasons why Nigeria had a coup, and some people carried out “Operation Wetie,” and the civil strife the country has experienced since the 1950s.
