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3. Anber. “Modernisation and Political Disintegration,” pp. 163–79.
4. Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, p. 46.
5. Anber, “Modernisation and Political Disintegration,” pp. 163–79.
6. Ibid. Anber’s own observations of this shortcoming are instructive:
Like most parvenus, many Igbos also became arrogant and self-righteous in their new status, thus arousing the resentment of other ethnic groups, the Northerners in particular, whom the Igbos generally regarded contemptuously as backward and inferior. Caught in the “revolution of rising expectations,” confronted with a political system in which the numerically superior Northerners were destined to maintain dominance, cognisant of the corruption in government circles and the obstacles to effective constitutional change, the Igbos also quickly became aware of the contradiction between their aspirations and the actualities of their condition. Their elevated status, educationally and economically, contrasted with their subordinate status politically.
7. Ibid. See also Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, pp. 48–49.
8. Anber, “Modernisation and Political Disintegration,” pp. 163–79.
9. Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), p. 467.
10. Ibid.
11. Anber, “Modernisation and Political Disintegration,” pp. 163–79.
12. Ibid. See also Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, p. 25.
13. Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism, p. 467.
14. Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, p. 25.
15. Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, with special attention to timeline and notable people in Nigerian history; Luckham, The Nigerian Military; Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria.
The Army
1. Information passed on to me directly from Christopher Okigbo and other personal sources; Alexandar Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980), p. 14; Adewale Ademoyega, Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup (Ibadan, Nigeria: Evans Brothers, 1981).
2. Ademoyega, Why We Struck; Luckham, The Nigerian Military.
3. Alex Madiebo, Robin Luckham, Dr. Nowa Omoigui, and other authorities on this subject suggest that over two scores of military officers and civilians were killed during that bloody coup. These include: “Chief F. S. Okotie-Eboh, Finance Minister of the Federation; Brigadier Zakari Mai-Malari, Commander of the 2nd Brigade Nigerian Army; and Colonel K. Mohammed, Chief of Staff, Nigerian Army. Other casualties of this coup were Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Unegbe, Quartermaster General; Li
eutenant-Colonel J. T. Pam, Adjutant General, Nigerian Army; Lieutenant-Colonel A. Largema, Commanding Officer 4th Battalion, Ibadan; and S. L. Akintola, Premier of Western Nigeria.”
Apart from Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, “the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of Northern Nigeria, others killed in the north included Brigadier S. Ademulegun, Commander of the 1st Brigade NA; Colonel R. A. Shodeinde, Deputy Commandant, Nigerian Defense Academy; Ahmed Dan Musa, Senior Assistant Secretary (Security) to the North Regional Government; and Sergeant Duromola Oyegoke of the Nigerian Army. There were rumors that the senior wife of Sir Ahmadu Bello and the wife of Brigadier Ademulegun were also killed.”
There were a number of political leaders whose lives were spared but were nevertheless arrested and detained in Lagos and Kaduna: “Sir Kashim Ibrahim—Governor of Northern Nigeria; Aba Kadangare Gobara—Assistant Principal Private Secretary to the Premier of Northern Nigeria; Alhaji Hassan Lemu—Principal private secretary to the Premier of Northern Nigeria; and B. A. Fani-Kayode—at the time Deputy Premier of Western Nigeria.”
Sources: Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War; Luckham, The Nigerian Military; Arthur Nwankwo and Samuel Ifejika, Biafra: The Making of a Nation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969); Nowamagbe Omoigui, “Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966,” Part I, Urhobo Historical Society.
4. Major General Alexander Madiebo (Ret.), commander of the Biafran army, recalls this period this way:
The January coup was widely acclaimed all over the country, including the northern Region, where top civil servants celebrated its success and apparently happy ending by holding parties both in their homes and in public places. Acting against my advice that it was improper from the protocol point of view, Katsina [Governor of the Nigerian Northern Region] visited my house immediately after his appointment. He brought with him his entire entourage of police outriders and patrol cars and a carload of drinks. We all drank to the health of Ironsi. We drank to the health of the new governors. We drank to the survival of a new Nigeria. Katsina would probably say now, I did all that to deceive old Alex into believing all was well. I sincerely believed that he was acting in good faith that night we drank the toasts.
Source: Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War.
5. The coup plotters had killed Brigadier Zak Maimalari, Lieutenant Colonel Abogo Largema, and the prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.
6. Members of his supreme military council included: “Babafemi Ogundipe as Chief of Staff, Nigerian Defense forces; Yakubu Gowon as Chief of Staff, Army; and Military governors of the four regions at the time. These were Chukwuemeka Ojukwu—Military Governor of Eastern Region; Adekunle Fajuyi—Military Governor of Western Region; David Ejoor—Military Governor of Mid-western Region; and Hassan Katsina-Military Governor of the Northern Region.”
Sources: Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War; Luckham, The Nigerian Military; Nwankwo and Ifejika, Biafra; Henryka Schabowska and Ulf Himmelstrand, Africa Reports on the Nigerian Crisis: News, Attitudes, and Background Information: A Study of Press Performance, Government Attitude to Biafra and Ethno-Political Integration (Upsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978).; Philip Effiong, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story (Princeton: Sungai, 2004); Ademoyega, Why We Struck; Metz, Nigeria.
Interviews with retired Nigerian soldiers; and Omoigui, “Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966.”
7. They were actively being told this, mainly by local and foreign observers and radio and diplomatic types.
